To enable global scale quantum key distribution 1-3 (QKD), satellite based systems 4, 5 are the most promising approach. So far, free-space QKD has already been demonstrated on communication channels with attenuation comparable to satellite downlinks, 6 and classical laser communications with satellites and aircrafts is heavily explored.
INTRODUCTION
While in classical communication the bit values "0" and "1" are used to encode the message, in quantum information qubits are used. They can be formed by in principle every two-level quantum system and additionally allow for a coherent superposition of the quantum states | 0 and | 1 . For communication applications, photons are most often used to implement the qubits as they can be easily transmitted through the air or via fibers. For free-space transmissions the polarization degree of freedom is the best choice for encoding quantum information.
Exploiting the extra properties of qubits compared to classical bits, Quantum key distribution (QKD) 3 can offer a level of security 11 which can not be reached with any classical methods: The underlying QKD protocols (here we use BB84 1 ) base exclusively on quantum mechanical principles. Moreover, the security proofs 12 show that the QKD transmission noise, i.e. the quantum bit error rate (QBER), is a measure for the amount of information an eavesdropper may have gained. This allows for the distillation of a shorter, yet secure key from the transmitted raw data using classical hash functions. This approach is in contrast to classical key distribution schemes where eavesdropping can not be detected or quantified and where the security is only given by the computational complexity of the algorithm used and thus may vanish with future technology.
The distance over which QKD was demonstrated could be increased over the last years successively both in fiber and free-space 6, 13, 14 and also the combination of several links to trusted node quantum networks was shown. 15, 16 Noisy quantum channels and detectors, however, impose upper limits on the operating distance of a QKD system in the range of 150 − 200 km. 6, 13, 14 Quantum repeaters 17 could extend these distances, however, they seem to be available rather on a long time scale. For secure key exchange on a global scale QKD transmitters on (trusted) satellites are promising candidates.
Experiments on the channel characteristics of aircraft and satellite downlinks 7, 9, 10 have already demonstrated successful telescope tracking and classical communication with moving airborne/space systems. In addition, long range free-space QKD and entanglement distribution was shown on a horizontal distance of 144 km between two of the canary islands 6, 18-20 coping with attenuation and fluctuations comparable to optical links between satellites and telescopes on the ground. So far, however, all these experiments are restricted to stationary systems. Our experiment now for the first time integrates a BB84 system with an airborne platform ( fig. 1 ). Major challenges arise from the integration into an existing communication terminal, from the need for polarization compensation of the optical channel and from the high pointing requirements compared to classical optical communication.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In the presented experimental flight campaign the QKD equipment was integrated into the Free-space Experimental Laser Terminal 2 (FELT2) and the optical ground station (OGS) of the German Aerospace Center's (DLR) Institute for Communications and Navigation. 7, 8 This system was originally built to provide fast data links for large area imaging and to measure channel behaviour of the aircraft-ground and LEO-ground link.
7 It can provide a stable optical channel with the help of bidirectional beacon lasers (1550 nm/1590 nm) in aircraft to ground scenarios. Additionally, the OGS is also capable of communicating optically with satellites in low earth orbit and thus can operate with sufficiently high angular velocities.
As a qubit has to be a single quantum entity, in contrast to classical optical communications, it is not possible to increase the transmitter power in order to adapt to a particular channel attenuation. Rather, efficient coupling between sender and receiver by small beam divergence and precise pointing has to be ensured. Therefore, both the FELT2 and the OGS were equipped with additional fine pointing assemblies (FPA) each consisting of a fast actuated mirror and a position sensitive sensor in a control loop to enable this experiment.
For the quantum key exchange, a transmitter for polarization encoded, attenuated pulse QKD 21, 22 according to the BB84 protocol (Alice module, fig. 2 ) was designed and integrated into the FELT2. With the help of a photodiode on a servo arm, the Alice module can autonomously calibrate the average QKD pulse intensity to 0.5 photons/pulse to compensate temperature drifts underneath the safety hood covering the terminal during flight. On the ground, the OGS was supplemented with a QKD receiver (Bob module, fig 3) analyzing the incoming qubits in accordance with the BB84 protocol. Upstream to this module, a polarization controller was mounted consisting of three motorized wave plates which allowed to compensate for polarization rotations due to the constantly changing orientation of the aircraft relative to the OGS and thus the FELT2 pointing mirrors. Compensation parameters were obtained from prior measurements of the birefringence for all pointing directions and online pointing information transmitted live from the FELT2 (via uhf-link).
FLIGHT CAMPAIGN
The flight campaign took place at the special aircraft Oberpfaffenhofen Germany. The experiment was performed on half circles with a radius of ≈ 20 km around the OGS located on a rooftop close to the runway. As the important co-alignment of the QKD beam and the pointing axis could not be stabilized actively, this was readjusted before every flight on a distance of 300 m.
A fine tuning of this alignment in flight was possible by introducing small offsets in the FELT2 control loop.
Thereby we were able to increase the coupling for the QKD beam (divergence ≈ 180 µrad) without negative impact on the performance of the pointing system as the terminal beacon had a much wider divergence of 3 mrad.
The new FPA provided a stable optical channel for the whole passage with a mean pointing error of the FELT2 of less then 150 µrad. This enabled a continuous quantum transmission for 10 min during which we experienced an overall attenuation of 42.7 dB including also software time filtering of the events with acceptance windows of 500 ps width. At a repetition frequency of 10 MHz we achieved a sifted key rate of 145 bit/s at a QBER of 4.8 %. As over 60 % of the errors occurred due to stray light and dark count events (≈ 4000 s −1 ), this QBER proves for a precise compensation of the dynamic polarization disturbance inherent to any airborne 
RESULTS
In this experiment we successfully integrated QKD technology with an existing system for classical free-space laser communication. Thereby we prove QKD to be a suitable add-on for a variety of communication systems working on a direct line of sight. The fine pointing assemblies developed in this work enabled a stable link for the complete passage of the airplane. Moreover, the constantly changing birefringence introduced by the various moving mirrors and the optical coatings could be compensated precisely. By successfully addressing these challenges, we were able to demonstrate the first BB84 key exchange with an airborne transmitter at high angular velocity. This experiment can thus be regarded as a huge step towards QKD with and between airplanes and satellites enabling world wide, secure key exchange in a trusted node topology.
